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Abstract: This paper presents prelim-
inary findings of the project “Analyz-
ing children’s implicit argumentation: 
Reconstruction of procedural and 
material premises.” This interdiscipli-
nary project builds on argumentation 
theory and developmental sociocultur-
al psychology for the study of chil-
dren’s argumentation. We reconstruct 
children’s inferences in adult-child 
and child-child dialogical interaction 
in conversation in different settings. In 
particular, we focus on implicit 
premises using the Argumentum 
Model of Topics (AMT) for the 
reconstruction of the inferential 
configuration of arguments. Our 
findings reveal that sources of misun-
derstandings are, more often than not, 
due to misalignments of implicit 
premises between adults and children; 
these misalignments concern material 
premises rather than the inferential-
procedural level. 
Résumé: Cette contribution présente 
les résultats préliminaires du projet 
«Analyse de l’argumentation implicite 
des enfants: reconstruction des pré-
misses procédurales et matérielles». 
Ce projet interdisciplinaire s’appuie 
sur la théorie de l’argumentation et sur 
la psychologie socioculturelle du 
développement pour étudier 
l’argumentation des enfants. Nous 
reconstruisons les inférences des 
enfants dans des interactions dialo-
giques au cours de conversations 
adulte-enfant et enfant-enfant dans 
différents contextes. En particulier, 
nous nous concentrons sur les pré-
misses implicites en utilisant le Argu-
mentum Model of Topics (AMT)  pour 
la reconstruction de la configuration 
inférentielle des arguments. Nos 
résultats révèlent que les sources de 
malentendus résident le plus souvent 
dans le non-alignement des prémisses 
des adultes et des enfants; et que ces 
non-alignements concernent plus 
souvent les prémisses matérielles que 
les procédures inférentielles. 
Keywords: adult-children discussion, children’s argumentation, implicit premis-
es, inference, inferential-procedural premises, material-contextual premises, 
misunderstanding, developmental socio-cultural psychology 
1. Introduction
This paper will show that a careful reconstruction of children’s 
inferences and their implicit premises in natural conversations 
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helps to understand children’s contributions to dialogical argumen-
tative activities. Of the growing studies on argumentation in 
context in the last decade, a large majority concentrates on adults’ 
argumentation and largely, though not exclusively, on professional 
contexts such as juridical or political argumentation (see criticism 
in Schwarz and Baker 2017). 
 However, we find studies about children’s argumentative skills 
abundant in psychology and education, rather than argumentation. 
The field of argumentation in education is growing; with a 
particular focus on the relationship between argumentation and 
learning (Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, and Gilabert 2013), scholars 
distinguish between learning to argue and arguing to learn 
(Andriessen et al. 2003; Schwarz 2009). The former process 
involves the acquisition of skills of reasoning and argumentation, 
while in the latter students use argumentation to “achieve a specific 
goal,” which often means “to understand or to construct specific 
knowledge” (Schwarz 2009, p. 92). Although argumentation and 
learning is not the subject of our study, it is important to recall the 
content of this research stream because it is one of the fields in 
which children’s arguments have been studied extensively. Often, 
there is a focus on the individual child’s reasoning skills and on 
how to improve them. As Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, and Gilabert 
(2013, p. 483) put it, “argumentation is one of the most discussed 
competencies in the educational field, due to its proven relationship 
with critical and higher-order thinking.” Ultimately, the “fostering 
of students' rationality is a fundamental educational aim” (Siegel 
1995, p. 161). Because of the focus on learning, educational studies 
often investigate teacher-student interactions (oral and written) in a 
classroom context (to mention a few examples of a broad literature, 
see Kuhn 2010, 2016; Felton et al. 2015; Osborne, Erduran and 
Simon 2004; Schwarz 2009; Kuhn, Hemberger and Khait 2017).1 
1 It is also worth mentioning that literature on children’s classroom argumenta-
tion concerns different local educational systems; arguably, this is because 
argumentation in the classroom heavily depends on how the educational system 
is designed. Notably, to name but a few languages and traditions in Europe other 
than English, studies on children’s argumentation exist in German (Hannken-
Illjes 2004; Hauser and Luginbühl 2017), French (Dolz-Mestre and Toubola 
Couchepin 2015), Italian (Ajello, Pontecorvo and Zucchermaglio 2004; Santi 
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Children’s argumentative skills can be enhanced by appropriate 
educational interventions. Consequently, as Rapanta and Macagno 
(2016, p. 142) note, “a growing number of scholars is focusing on 
the strategies for implementing argumentative tasks in the class-
room and analyzing and/or assessing their effects” (see also An-
driessen and Schwarz 2009).  
 The interest in argumentation in the classroom is also partially 
due to a widespread perception that having children engage in an 
argumentative discussion in a school context is not always an easy 
task (see the discussion in Muller Mirza and Buty 2015; Schwarz 
and Baker 2017). However, the concept that children’s skills need 
improvement partially conflicts with other studies2 that have 
demonstrated with qualitative as well as quantitative methods that 
children do naturally engage in argumentation in educational set-
tings (e.g., Kuhn 1991; Kuhn and Udell 2003; Psaltis and Duveen 
2006; Migdalek et al. 2014; Schwarz and Baker 2017). Research on 
informal family conversations undertaken in argumentation and 
socio-cultural psychology reinforce these positive findings. Some 
studies point at surprisingly developed logical and pragmatic skills 
of children who present their own arguments (Völzing 1982; Pon-
tecorvo and Sterponi 2006; Bova and Arcidiacono 2013; Anderson 
et al. 1997). These partially conflicting findings invite further 
research on children’s argumentation, inside but also outside the 
classroom.  
 In this paper, we are interested in children’s argumentation in 
natural conversation with no specific focus on learning or class-
room contexts. We adopt a dialogical perspective, trying to under-
stand what happens in a micro-setting of social interaction rather 
2006). This list is certainly not complete, and we only mentioned a few exempla-
ry references within the many possible. 
2 It is only a partial conflict since children’s argumentative skills can exist and 
still be in need of improvement. Strikingly, however, some studies start from a 
deficiency/insufficiency attributed to children (see the discussion in Muller 
Mirza and Buty 2015); other studies transmit a much more positive interpretation 
of children’s contributions to argumentative discussions (see for example Ander-
son et al. 1997). 
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than focusing on the child’s individual skills.3 We leave the ques-
tion: “how can educators improve or facilitate children’s argumen-
tative skills?” aside, although this remains a legitimate and widely 
discussed question in education.4 We want to contribute by answer-
ing other questions informed by the literature on developmental 
sociocultural psychology, namely: “what do children do when they 
contribute to argumentative discussions?” and in particular, “do 
implicit premises explain some possible misunderstandings be-
tween children and adults?” We do not assume any particular mod-
el about the skills that children should display at their age—rather, 
we want to observe how the conversation unfolds and how they 
contribute to argumentative discussions. Such is the rationale be-
hind the project “Analyzing children’s implicit argumentation: 
Reconstruction of procedural and material premises” (henceforth: 
ArgImp project), on which the authors of this paper are collaborat-
ing.5 This project delves into children’s inferences and their implic-
it premises in “spontaneous” conversations, operating at the 
intersection between studies in developmental socio-cultural 
psychology and Argumentation theory. This paper presents some 
preliminary findings of the project.  
 In this paper, we base our study on contexts other than the 
classroom and take into account small children (from 2 to 6 years). 
We adopt a micro-approach to the dialogical interaction between 
adults and children in specific interactional settings. In particular, 
we argue that reconstructing children’s inferences and their implicit 
premises within dialogical contexts contributes to explain how 
(some) children’s interventions might prima facie appear as reason-
3 For a discussion on the complex interrelation between the individual’s own 
development and the social setting and interaction, see Iannaccone and Perret-
Clermont (1993). 
4 Consequently, our study takes a different perspective from the field that is 
usually referred to as “argumentation and education”. However, there are poten-
tial implications of our approach for educational settings; these are touched upon 
at the end of the paper, but they are not the center of our analysis. 
5 Applicants of this project, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(grant n. 100019_156690), are Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Sara Greco, Anto-
nio Iannaccone, and Andrea Rocci. Josephine Convertini and Rebecca Schär 
participate as PhD students and have collected the data analyzed in this paper. 
5
ing “mistakes” to teachers or researchers, when in fact they are not 
if one considers the child's perspective. Some of these “mistakes” 
depend on implicit starting points that are not shared by the inter-
locutors. These misalignments in implicit premises might partly 
explain why, in some situations, children’s argumentation skills 
appear less developed than adults expect. 
 The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: In 
section 2, we will discuss the reconstruction of children’s infer-
ences and the theoretical instruments that we will use for this study. 
Section 3 briefly outlines the different contexts in which our data 
on children’s argumentation have been collected. Section 4 analyz-
es examples of children’s argumentation in which we intend to 
show how a careful reconstruction of implicit premises within 
inference is subservient to a better understanding of children’s 
starting points and of their arguments altogether. These results are 
discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 has the function of draw-
ing some preliminary conclusions, as well as of situating the pre-
sent paper in the context of our broader research line on this topic. 
2. Theoretical starting points of this study
2.1 The analysis of children’s inferences between argumentation 
and psychology  
Some studies on children’s argumentation, conducted mainly in 
psychology, indicate that it is important to reconstruct implicit 
premises in order to understand the rationale behind children’s 
arguments, including those that appear prima facie weird, wrong, 
or underdeveloped. Piaget (1926) suggested that it was important to 
study children’s specific representations of the world. Later, also in 
the field of psychology, Hundeide (1992, pp. 143-144) reports that 
Norwegian children reason much better on a Piagetian task when 
the premise of their discourse involves considering snowballs and 
not white and black abstract circles. He comments: 
The difficulty of a problem cannot be assessed from an analysis of 
the logical structure of the problem or question as such. We have 
instead to uncover the nesting of premises through microanalysis 
of message structure. Through this procedure it may be possible to 
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identify alternative sequences of cognitive steps bound to different 
interpretive premises in relation to the ‘same problem’ (...) an at-
tempt at portraying thinking from the ‘insider's point of view’ 
(Shotter 1985). 
 Through an analysis of naturally occurring talk between children 
in the 4th grade at school, Anderson et al. (1997) show that chil-
dren’s arguments might seem elliptical but often are “as informa-
tive as they needed to be” (Anderson et al. 1997, p. 138). In fact, 
apparently missing premises are actually supplied either by the 
preceding discussion or by general principles, both available to a 
cooperative listener.  
 These findings show that a careful reconstruction of inference 
should precede the evaluation of children’s arguments. This recon-
struction should go hand in hand with a pragmatic account of what 
is happening in the here-and-now of the interaction, including 
preceding discussions and the expectations set by the context. 
Research in psychology has shown that children are likely to give 
quite different meaning to the same questions asked in teaching or 
testing situations, depending on the events and narratives involved 
(Donaldson 1978), the setting, and the relational context (Light and 
Perret-Clermont 1989; Iannaccone and Perret-Clermont 1993). As a 
result, their cognitive performances are quite different—a matter 
known to skilled clinicians (Grossen 2014). Other studies show that 
there is a great deal of information that adults leave implicit and 
take for granted, albeit it is not necessarily accessible to children. 
Elbers (2004) draws attention to the importance of the conversa-
tional asymmetry that might lead to neglecting children's perspec-
tives and underestimating their skills. If the child is considered a 
partner in conversation rather than an object of research, a different 
account of children’s reasoning skills emerges (Pramling and Säljö 
2015; Mauritzson and Säljö 2001). 
 On the basis of these considerations, in our research on chil-
dren’s argumentation, we have adopted a principle of pragmatic 
and inferential integrity. By pragmatic integrity, we mean that 
children’s argumentative contributions should not be considered as 
“isolated” argumentative productions to be evaluated independently 
from the interaction with other children and adults, or from the 
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context in which the interaction takes place. On the contrary, chil-
dren’s arguments should be seen as part of an ongoing discussion, 
which must be comprehensively taken into account in order to 
understand their inferences. In other words, we interpret argumen-
tation from a dialogical viewpoint (Nonnon 1996, 2015; Plantin 
1996). In particular, we assume a general pragma-dialectical 
framework (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004) to analyze 
adult-children and child-child discussions as argumentative discus-
sions. The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is 
normative in the sense that it offers a grid for analyzing how an 
argumentative discussion should proceed in order to resolve a 
difference of opinion between the interlocutors on the merits (cf. 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). This is a normative aspect in 
our study, which is related to our interpretation of argumentation. 
On the contrary, we do not have any normative expectations about 
how children should behave in order to display their argumentative 
skills, we simply want to reconstruct what they are doing with their 
arguments.6
 By inferential integrity, we mean that we intend to carefully 
reconstruct children’s contributions to argumentative discussions 
from an inferential viewpoint; we carefully reconstruct the argu-
ments proposed by the children, including their implicit premises. 
Following Anderson et al. (1997), we assume that a careful recon-
struction of implicit premises might shed light on what children are 
trying to do with their interventions and what types of starting 
points they take for granted. 
2.2 Reconstructing children’s inferences through the Argumentum 
Model of Topics 
Our analysis will be guided by the Argumentum Model of Topics 
(AMT, Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010) for the study of inference 
and the reconstruction of implicit premises. The choice of this 
6 In our view, the term normative model has a different meaning in argumenta-
tion and in studies on children in the field of education. In this paper, we adopt a 
normative model of argumentation, but we do not have a normative model (in 
the educational sense) of how children should behave or what level of compe-
tence they should have. 
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model is mainly motivated by the fact that the AMT offers the 
advantage of clearly distinguishing two different types of premises 
when analyzing the relation between an argument and the stand-
point it supports. Two components make up the inferential configu-
ration of every single argument: an inferential-procedural and a 
material-contextual component.  
 The inferential-procedural component represents the inferential 
principle, which the argument relies on. The inferential-procedural 
component includes the locus, i.e., the relation that is at the origin 
of inference (e.g., locus from cause to effect or effect to cause). 
Moreover, at the level of premises that are activated in each 
argument, the inferential-procedural component includes the 
specific inferential rule (maxim) derived by the locus and used as 
an often implicit premise in argumentation (e.g., “if the cause is 
present, the effect will be present”). Real life arguments, however, 
are not only based on abstract inferential principles, they need to be 
grounded in a material-contextual component, made up of premises 
linked to the cultural and contextual background of the 
interlocutors. The AMT distinguishes these two types of premises 
and explains how they interact in argumentation.7 
 Distinguishing between inferential-procedural and material 
premises is particularly important in the context of the present 
research. This allows us to understand where potential differences 
or even misunderstandings between children and adults might lie, 
without confusing the logical form of their reasoning and the infer-
ential starting points with the material-contextual premises. In 
particular, the reconstruction of material-contextual premises, 
especially if they are left implicit and considered as taken for 
granted, gives a perspective on what is or is not inter-subjectively 
shared by the interlocutors. We expect that a careful reconstruction 
of young children’s implicit material premises will be important to 
7 A more detailed presentation of the Argumentum Model of Topics and a 
discussion of the advantages it offers to reconstruct implicit premises are beyond 
the scope of this paper. For a more detailed discussion on the model, see Rigotti 
and Greco Morasso (2010) and Rigotti and Greco (2019). For a discussion on the 
distinction between inferential-procedural and material-contextual premises, see 
Bigi and Greco Morasso (2012) and Musi (2014). 
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understand their starting points, when they differ from their adult 
interlocutors’ expectations (and vice versa) and why they are dif-
ferent. The reconstruction of implicit starting points in this sense 
connects the reconstruction of inference with the reconstruction of 
the pragmatics of the conversation: in fact, some implicit premises 
might be explained not as missing parts of an argument but as parts 
that are left unsaid because they are considered common 
knowledge. 
3. Empirical data
The data discussed in this paper have been collected within the 
ArgImp project in two different settings, both of which involve 
adult-child argumentation. The first context is unstructured (“spon-
taneous”) discussions in a family context. The second context is 
made up of conversations taking place during semi-structured play 
activities in a kindergarten. Although different, these two settings 
share some common traits that make the two corpora homogene-
ous. First, they both include preschool children (from 2 to 6 years); 
second, the conversation often includes not only children but also 
adults. In the case of family discussions, the adults normally in-
clude one or both parents, other relatives and sometimes the re-
searcher, who is asked by children to take part in the discussion or 
play with them. In the case of play activities, the children are inter-
acting with each other, and, at times, with the researcher. The 
researcher both presents the task and, at the end of the activity, 
debriefs the activity and task with the children. 
 The data on everyday conversations in a family setting has been 
collected from 12 families in three different linguistic regions of 
Switzerland. No specific task was given to the families, they were 
free to choose what to do.8 Our goal was to observe natural occur-
ring discussion in the families’ everyday life. Sometimes, the chil-
8 This study of families’ spontaneous argumentation was initially inspired by 
Pontecorvo and Arcidiacono (2007). However, these authors analyze family 
discussions at the dinner table. In our research project, because our focus is on 
much younger children, we decided to avoid conversation at dinnertime and 
concentrate on other moments of family life. In our pilot study we found that 
younger children were often too tired to have discussions during dinner. 
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dren asked the researcher to play with them. We noticed that the 
children did not see the presence of an extraneous person in the 
family home as intrusive. More often than not, they interpreted the 
researcher as a friend of their parents who was visiting them and 
even played with them. 
 The data on semi-structured play activities have been collected 
in two different kindergartens. The first one is located in the 
French-speaking part of Switzerland and the second one in Italy. 
The researcher met the children in their usual playroom at the 
kindergarten. She introduced specific activities, which were intend-
ed to make them discuss and reason. Most of these activities were 
inspired by Piaget (1974) or by the foundation La main à la pâte.9 
They are activities of construction based on building blocks or 
other toys. Each activity included a semi-structured task for the 
children to complete. More details about the specific activities will 
be given in section 4. 
 Family conversations were recorded by audio; play activities at 
the kindergarten were recorded in both audio and video. In both 
cases, the researchers were present during the interaction. The data 
have been transcribed according to a slightly adapted version of the 
notation system proposed by Traverso (1999). Because all the 
extracts analyzed in this paper are in languages other than English, 
we provide the original text together with our own translation in 
section 4. 
4. Analysis: Preliminary findings of the ArgImp project
In this section, we will discuss the main findings obtained so far
in the ArgImp project, concerning the analysis of children’s partial-
ly implicit inferences as contributions to an argumentative discus-
sion. We have chosen three examples, each has an illustrative and 
representative function. The examples were chosen in accordance 
with two main criteria. First, we have chosen representative cases 
in the sense that the dynamics observed in these cases are also 
9 See http://www.fondation-lamap.org/en/international, last visited September 
2017. 
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present in other examples found in our corpora.10 Second, we have 
included both naturally occurring family conversations and semi-
structured play activities in the kindergarten in order to have a way 
to show whether or not it is possible to retrace similar dynamics in 
different settings. 
 In line with Anderson et al. (1997), we found that children’s 
arguments are often elliptical because there are implicit premises 
and sometimes the standpoint is also implicit. More often than not, 
children make explicit the datum, that is, the factual material prem-
ise supporting the standpoint in the framework of an inferential 
configuration that is often largely implicit. This is not different 
from what happens with adults’ conversations. In both cases, a 
pragmatic principle implies that what is taken for granted is super-
fluous and should not be repeated, as this would go against a coop-
erative principle in conversation (Grice 1975). 
 In AMT terms, we found that maxims, i.e., inferential-
procedural starting points, are always left implicit. Material starting 
points such as endoxa might be made explicit by children if they 
are controversial (e.g., when they are challenged by adults), which 
confirms the findings by Anderson et al. (1997). Moreover, we 
analyzed cases of children’s inferences that come to the “wrong” 
10 In order to give a picture of the examples that are present in our corpora, we 
might refer to some approximate figures. We counted 202 episodes of argumen-
tative discussions in the two corpora analyzed in this paper. Focusing on chil-
dren’s contributions within these discussions, we counted around 208 examples 
of a child’s single argumentation (standpoint + argument). Now, 55 of these 208 
examples (around 26.5% of the total), in our interpretation, are cases in which 
material-contextual premises of adults and children are divergent and children’s 
endoxa might seem ‘bizarre’ from an adult’s perspective; but the procedural-
inferential part of children’s argument is correct. On this basis, we claim that the 
phenomenon of divergent material-contextual premises, but ‘correct’ procedural-
inferential premises is recurrent in our data. Therefore, it is worth having a closer 
look at it. The three examples discussed in this paper are chosen as representative 
of these 55 cases. Needless to say, our calculations are dependent on our inter-
pretation as analysts of argumentation (for example, what we calculate as an 
“argumentative discussion”). Therefore, these figures might be subject to debate. 
However, they are meant to give a rough idea of how the three analyses in this 
paper are actually representing a recurrent phenomenon that is worth investigat-
ing. 
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conclusions (or to conclusions that are interpreted as “wrong” by 
the adults who are taking part in the conversation). In these cases, 
more often than not the reason is to be found in the material prem-
ises, particularly in the endoxa. The procedural-inferential starting 
points tend to be applied correctly and tend to be based on a princi-
ple of support that is acceptable. In contrast, the children’s endoxa 
sometimes refer to a “worldview” that is partial or in the course of 
development or is different from what their adult interlocutors 
expected. 
 A first illustration of this kind of result has been discussed in 
Greco (2016). In this work, the example is given of a toddler, 
slightly older than two, who maintains that the bottom part of an 
apple (remnants of calyx) is a bee because it stings. We know that 
it is not a bee, but what is interesting is to understand where the 
child’s “mistake” lies. The principle (locus from definition) is 
correctly applied, and we can agree with the definitional maxim 
stating that “If x has got the specific and exclusive characteristic of 
a species A, then x is an A.” However, the endoxon, namely that 
“the specific and exclusive characteristic of the species ‘bee’ is 
‘stinging’ (all that stings is a bee)” is based on a partial view of 
reality, probably depending on the child’s limited experience of this 
subject. Presumably, the child will revise this endoxon over time, 
as his experience grows. From a psychological perspective, it is 
very interesting to distinguish the child's reasoning (successfully 
making an inference) from his factual knowledge (about bees and 
insects). 
 This kind of dynamic is often present in our data and represents 
a central finding of the ArgImp project. We will now discuss three 
examples taken from the corpora introduced in section 3. 
4.1 The TUC® example 
 The first example is taken from the corpus of conversations in a 
family setting collected by R. Schär. The discussion was recorded 
in the Swiss-German-speaking region of Switzerland in February 
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2016. The participants of this discussion are Levin,11 who is three 
years and two months old, and his mother. They talk about the 
researcher (R.), who on that afternoon visited them for the second 
time at their home. The conversation took place immediately after 
the researcher arrived at the family’s home. When sitting down in 
the living room, the mother asks the researcher whether she would 
like to have a cup of tea, since the mother and Levin were having 
tea and biscuits as the researcher arrived. While the mother fills a 
cup with tea for the researcher, Levin starts talking. 
Table 1 The TUC® example. Participants: Levin, mother 
Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Levin d R. wett äu ä chli 
tee (1.0) 
R. also wants some tea
(1.0)
2 Mother m:hm m:hm 
3 Levin die do= these ones= 
4 Mother und no es Tuc 
((keks)) chaschere 
äno geh 
and a Tuc ((cookie)) you 
can give her one too 
5 Levin es↑ a↑ 
6 Mother es Tuc (3.0) a Tuc (3.0) 
7 Levin nid ade erwachsnig 
gschider 
better not to adults 
8 Mother momol die sind ä für 
die erwachsnige 
Yes, they are for adults too 
11 All names mentioned in this paper have been changed to protect the privacy of 
the participants. All identifying information has been removed. 
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Levin transforms this exchange into an argumentative discus-
sion at turn 7 12 when he problematizes his mother’s request to give 
a TUC® cookie to the researcher (turn 4). 
Figure 1 AMT representation of the TUC® example (Levin’s argumenta-
tion) 
 Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the AMT analysis of 
Levin’s argumentation in extract 1. On the right, the procedural 
premises of this argument are represented. In this case, the argu-
ment is based on the locus from ontological implications (Rigotti 
and Greco forthcoming). This locus builds on the relation between 
the nature of an entity (in this case, cookies) and what this nature 
implies. Or, more precisely, the end for which this entity has been 
designed. In the AMT, the locus from ontological implications is 
part of the category of definitional loci. Some definitional proce-
dures derive from the purpose of an object (e.g., when we say that a 
yoga mat is a type of mat designed for practicing yoga, we give a 
definition based on the goal of the yoga mat). The ontological 
implication on which this argument is built derives from this kind 
of functional definition. 
 The maxim, in this case, is formulated on a negative variant: “if 
something is not made for x, it should not be given to x.” We have 
reconstructed this maxim, which is actually implicit. We could 
12 For a typology of how argumentative discussion are opened within adult-
children conversations, see Schär (2018) and Schär and Greco (2018). 
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speculate that the child might have derived this maxim indirectly, 
starting from cases in which he is denied access to things that are 
“not for children”—such as alcohol, to mention an obvious example 
in the domain of food and beverages. In any case, this principle, 
per se, might be correctly applied, despite some limitations, in a 
series of everyday situations. Think for example of cars, which are 
not meant for children to drive. 
 While the maxim, thus, can be correctly applied at least in some 
domains, the material premises of this argument—in particular the 
endoxon—require a more nuanced appreciation. The datum “R is an 
adult” is not explicitly said by the child, arguably because it is 
visible to everybody in the here-and-now of the conversation. The 
endoxon is made explicit by the child as a reaction to his mother’s 
request (turns 4 and 6): “[TUC® cookies are] better not for adults.” 
Apparently, this endoxon is not shared by the mother, although it is 
true that there are types of sweets and cakes that are made especial-
ly for children (in terms of marketing, packaging, etc.). For the 
mother TUC® cookies are for anyone.13 In this sense, example 1 is 
exemplary of a situation that we often find in our data: the child’s 
argument appears “wrong,” not because of a logical mistake but 
because the endoxon is different from what an adult would expect. 
4.2 The LEGO® example 
We find a similar dynamic in a different situation, taken from 
the corpus of semi-structured play activities and recorded in No-
vember 2016 in a kindergarten in Italy by one of the authors (J. 
Convertini). The researcher introduces an activity to the children, 
inspired by Piaget (1974). In this activity, they have to play with 
LEGO®. In particular, the researcher asks a dyad of children (a 6-
year-old male and a 5-year-old female) to build a bridge. She ex-
plains that two friends are waiting in their cars on opposite edges of 
a lake, they want to meet, and they need a bridge to do so. The two 
friends are LEGO® characters, a blue and a red one, respectively. 
The former is taller than the latter. All the materials have been 
13 The mother might be aware that TUC® cookies are not advertised as children’s 
cookies. 
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placed on a little table, around which children are free to move. The 
lake has been cut out from blue construction paper. After present-
ing the activity to the children, the researcher steps away from the 
table but stays in the room. It is not until the end of the construction 
activity that the researcher goes back to the children. 
Extract 2 reproduces the final moments of the discussion. When 
the children have completed the task, the researcher asks them to 
explain what they have been doing. After some discussion on the 
task, one of the children (Max) digresses and talks about the 
LEGO® figures that they have been playing with (see table 2). 
Table 2 The LEGO® example. Participants: Max, researcher 
Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Max questo qui ((prende 
in mano la sagoma 
lego di colore rosso, 
gli cade e lo 
riprende in mano e 
lo solleva)) questo 
qui è una femmina è 
un bimbo perché è 
più basso di lei (1.0) 
this one ((takes the red 
lego figure into his 
hand, the figure falls 
down, and he takes it 
into his hand again and 
lifts it up)) this one is a 
female and it is a child 
because it’s shorter 
than her (1.0) 
2 Researcher ah:: ah:: 
3 Max questo qui ((indica il 
lego di colore 
rosso)) 
this one ((indicates the 
red lego figure)) 
4 Researcher per l’altezza↑ because of the height↑ 
5 Max um um ((suono 
usato in senso 
affermativo)) 
um um ((affirming)) 
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Although the text transcribed in table 2 is partially ambiguous, it is 
clear that Max is comparing the two LEGO® figures. In the follow-
ing, we give a possible interpretation of Max’s argumentation, 
which could, of course, be subject to further discussion. Max 
makes a comment based on the size of one of the two characters, 
which is smaller than the other one, and argues that therefore it 
must be “a female, a child,”14 because “it’s shorter than her” (i.e., 
shorter than the other figure). In our interpretation of turn 1, two 
different reasons are given. The LEGO® figure might be shorter 
than the other figure either because it is a female or because it is a 
child. In general, this is a definitional argument relying on size as 
an indicator of something else. At the level of endoxa, we would 
have, “a property of children is to be smaller than adults”, which is 
generally acceptable (up to a certain age and with nuanced individ-
ual variations). Or, “a property of female persons is to be smaller 
than males”, which is not so obvious and not valid for each case. 
Both interpretations of Max’s endoxon are included in figure 2 in 
an AMT graphical representation. If the first interpretation is cor-
rect, the child is comparing children to adults and saying that chil-
dren are smaller than adults. If the second interpretation is correct, 
then the child is adopting an endoxon that is not correctly describ-
ing all possible male-female combinations in terms of height. How-
ever, even if partial, this endoxon might come from the child’s 
personal experience (e.g., his mother being shorter than his father?) 
or from children’s books or other cultural representations. Moreo-
ver, we might discuss whether Max is making a comparison be-
tween the two figures in the world of LEGO® or he is thinking of 
the “real world” of human children and adults.  
14 Turn 1 is not completely clear, because Max is comparing two figures and says 
that one is smaller than the other because it is female or because it is a “bimbo”. 
In Italian, “bimbo” is a male child; but a masculine noun can also be used for 
both male and female children. We opt for the second interpretation: in our view, 
Max is saying that one character is smaller than the other “because it is a female” 
or “because it is a child” (not a male child). In the following of the conversation, 
the researcher picks up one of these interpretations, namely that the character is a 
female, and Max confirms it. However, we are not commenting on this part, 
because this confirmation has been guided by the researcher’s interpretation. 
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Figure 2 AMT representation of the LEGO® example (Max’s argumenta-
tion, both interpretations of the endoxon are included) 
This example shows how an AMT analysis may help reconstruct 
different possible endoxa that are at the basis of children’s argu-
ments. Notably, as in the previous example, although the endoxon 
adopted by Max might be questionable if he is really taking for 
granted that “a property of female persons is to be smaller than 
males” in all cases, the inferential-procedural dynamics of the 
argument are correct. Again, this tells us that children’s arguments, 
at least in some cases, even when they appear as “bizarre” or come 
to a wrong conclusion, are not necessarily wrong altogether. A clue 
to further understand children’s argumentative skills and their 
contributions to an argumentative discussion seems to lie in a 
nuanced and careful consideration of material premises. 
4.3 The Fireman Sam example 
The third example also comes from the corpus of semi-structured 
play activities and has been recorded in a kindergarten in Italy in 
November 2016 by one of the authors (J. Convertini). This example 
is particularly interesting, in our view, because it shows that some-
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times a child’s refusal to respond to the adult’s task is due to a 
misalignment of implicit premises. 
 The task, in this case, is to build a tunnel with building blocks in 
such a way that toy cars can drive through it. The children (Mia, 
five years and six months old; and Tom, four years and two months 
old) are sitting around a table on which four pictures representing 
tunnels, some LEGO® bricks, and a red toy car are placed. At the 
beginning of the interaction (which we are not reporting in table 3), 
the researcher shows the pictures to the children. At some point, 
she talks about the red toy car. In previous interactions, the children 
referred to this same toy car as “Fireman Sam’s car,” alluding to an 
animated character that they probably know because of the TV 
series.15 Arguably, the red car “looks like” Sam’s car because of its 
color; Sam and his fellow firemen drive a red truck and a red car in 
the TV series. In this interaction, the adult researcher picks up this 
interpretation, although she is not familiar with the world of Fire-
man Sam. Therefore, while introducing this new task, she presents 
the red toy car as “Sam’s car” and the task as “building a tunnel for 
Sam’s city.” 
Table 3 The Fireman Sam example. Participants: Mia, Tom, re-
searcher 
Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Researcher e ci sono le luci dentro 
il tunnel perché 
altrimenti (.) non si 
vede niente è buio no 
dentro il tunnel (.) se 
non ci sono le luci non 
riusciamo a vedere (.) 
allora visto che avete 
and there are lights 
in the tunnel be-
cause otherwise (.) 
you cannot see 
anything it’s dark 
inside the tunnel is 
it (.) if there are no 
lights we won’t be 
15 Fireman Sam is an animated comedy for children, originally produced and 
broadcast in the UK. The series has been translated into Italian and broadcast in 
Italy since 2006. In the original story, Sam lives in the fictional village of Ponty-
pandy (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fireman_Sam, last visited September 
2017). 
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visto il tunnel io vi ho 
portato qua la 
macchinina di Sam il 
pompiere ((avvicina la 
macchinina ai bambini 
e Mia la prende in 
mano)) che la 
conoscete tutti e vi 
chiedo di costruire il 
suo tunnel ((prende la 
macchinina in mano)) 
allora il tunnel per 
essere utile 
able to see (.) so 
since you have seen 
the tunnel I brought 
to you Fireman 
Sam’s car ((holds 
the car closer to the 
children and Mia 
takes it into her 
hands)) that you all 
know and I’ll ask 
you to construct his 
tunnel ((takes the 
car into her hands)) 
so the tunnel in 
order to be useful 
2 Mia deve passare sotto must go under it 
3 Researcher deve passare [sotto must go [under it 
4 Tom           [ma ma] ma 
ma ma ma la città di 
Sam il pompiere u un 
c'ha u un u un c'ha un 
tunnel 
    [but but] but 
but but but the city 
of fireman Sam 
does n no does n no 
not have a tunnel 
5 Researcher ed è per quello che noi 
lo facciamo perché non 
ce l'ha (.) è per quello 
che noi lo facciamo (.) 
vai siediti Tom ((la 
ricercatrice fa sedere 
Tom)) però bisogna 
stare bene attenti che 
la nostra macchina 
riesca a passare sotto il 
tunnel perché se non 
riesce a passarci il 
and this is why we 
are making it be-
cause it does not 
have one (.) this is 
why we are making 
it (.) go sit down 
Tom ((makes Tom 
sit down)) but we 
need to pay atten-
tion that our car will 
be able to go under 
the tunnel because 
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tunnel dobbiamo 
rifarlo eh quindi state 
bene attenti che riesca 
a passarci vi lascio le 
costruzioni qua 
((avvicina le 
costruzioni ai 
bambini)) e poi vengo 
a vedere il tunnel che 
avete fatto 
if it does not suc-
ceed going under 
the tunnel we need 
to remake it so 
therefore pay atten-
tion that it can go 
under it I let you the 
building blocks here 
((puts the building 
blocks near the 
children)) and 
afterward I come to 
see the tunnel you 
made 
 The discussion about how to solve the task begins at turns 2-3. 
However, in turn, 4, one of the children (Tom) immediately reacts, 
saying that Sam’s city does not have a tunnel. The presentation of 
the task by the researcher is not necessarily argumentative; she 
presents the aim of the activity (constructing a tunnel) as “con-
structing his (i.e., Sam’s) tunnel.” Arguably, Tom interprets the 
adjective “suo” (his) in such a way that he understands “the tunnel 
that is in Sam’s city.” This is not literally what the adult has said 
but is a reasonable interpretation of her words. Tom then reinter-
prets the construction of the tunnel as a means to faithfully repro-
duce the city where Sam lives and works. From his reaction at turn 
4, we might say that Tom interprets the presentation of the task by 
the researcher as a form of means-end argumentation. The re-
searcher’s argumentation according to Tom’s interpretation can be 
reconstructed as in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 AMT representation of the Fireman Sam example (researcher’s 
argumentation according to Tom) 
 Tom’s objection at turn 4 stems from the fact that he does not 
share the datum proposed (or allegedly proposed) by the adult: 
Sam’s city does not have a tunnel. In this sense, because the child 
is more knowledgeable than the adult about the details of Sam’s 
world, there is an asymmetry of knowledge that is reversed (contra-
ry to what one would expect): the child knows more than the adult. 
Consequently, in response to Tom’s remark, the researcher reacts 
(turn 5) by rephrasing the goal of the interaction (endoxon). She 
says that they are building a tunnel precisely because Sam’s city 
does not have one. In this way, the researcher modifies the endox-
on: the goal is not faithfully reproducing Sam’s city but completing 
it. This means that the researcher has understood Tom’s objection 
and reacts in this way in order to correct the implicit material prem-
ise (endoxon) that Tom assumed was her premise. 
5. Discussion and further research
Two main aspects emerge from our analysis of the three examples 
presented in the preceding section. The first aspect is that the re-
construction of children’s inferences and, in particular, implicit 
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premises, contributes to a nuanced understanding of children’s 
argumentative skills. Findings from the ArgImp project show that 
isolating material premises from procedural premises permits the 
identification of possible sources of misunderstandings and argu-
ments that come to a “wrong” conclusion. In the case of children’s 
argumentation, we often note (as in all three examples discussed 
above) that arguments are correct from an inferential-procedural 
viewpoint, but they rely on endoxa that only partially reproduce 
adults' understandings of reality (further examples are discussed in 
Convertini, in preparation; Lombardi et al. 2018). Although the 
three examples considered are similar in this respect, they also 
present a further interesting aspect.  
 In example 1 (the TUC® example), we find a case in which the 
endoxon (“TUC® are not made for adults”) is made explicit by the 
child. While, more often than not, endoxa are left implicit in 
conversation for pragmatic reasons (see our discussion in section 
4), in this case, Levin makes it explicit. We may only make hy-
potheses about why he does so. Arguably, he needs to explain this 
endoxon because his mother appears not to share when she suggests 
him to give a TUC® to the researcher (table 1, turn 4). The fact that 
material-contextual premises are made explicit and subject to dis-
cussion sometimes when they are not shared between adults and 
children seems to confirm previous findings by Anderson et al. 
(1997). However, examples 2 and 3 (the LEGO® example and the 
Fireman Sam example, respectively) show that endoxa that are not 
shared by adults and children do not always become an object of 
discussion. Both cases suggest that it is important for analysts of 
argumentation, psychologists and other researchers to devote more 
attention to what is “taken for granted” in terms of material-
contextual premises in adult-children discussions. 
 Furthermore, in example 1, we could also wonder why Levin 
does not seem to feel the need to make the datum (“The researcher 
is an adult”) explicit, as we observed in section 4.1; whereas, in the 
other two examples, the datum is made explicit in children’s argu-
ments. Arguably, this happens because in example 1 the datum is 
factual evidence that is before the eyes of all participants to the 
discussion, who can see the researcher sitting at their family table 
© Sara Greco et. al. Informal Logic, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2018), pp. 438–470. 
24
in the here-and-now of the conversation. Therefore, mentioning the 
datum would be superfluous. This observation invites more re-
search on the role of perceptible or “evident” data in argumentative 
discussions, due to the socio-material setting of the conversation 
(for some observations see Iannaccone, Perret-Clermont and Con-
vertini, in preparation). 
 We now turn to example 3, which is particularly interesting to 
discuss in greater detail because it incorporates some further di-
mensions that go beyond our initial research aim and may be 
considered as emergent findings. Example 3 clearly shows that 
adults’ implicit endoxa are not always clear to the children. But 
more generally, it shows that it is not simply children’s endoxa that 
are “weird,” but adults' in some ways are, too. In fact, there is a 
problem of perspectivation, and we should take into account that 
adults’ implicit starting points might also be questioned (or difficult 
to understand) in conversation. This result is in line with findings 
by Pramling and Säljö (2015). In their study of Piagetian inter-
views, these authors show that taking into account the situatedness 
of the conversation (including adults’ implicit starting points) 
might change the interpretation of children's argumentation. All 
this suggests that, in order to improve argumentation (for example 
in educational settings), a careful consideration of both adults’ and 
children’s implicit premises would be necessary. That is, without 
forgetting that these premises are likely to change while the child 
(and sometimes even the adult) deepens his or her understanding of 
the issue (Miserez-Caperos 2017). 
 From the viewpoint of children’s argumentative skills, example 
3 also shows that Tom was able to reconstruct a possible means-
end argumentation allegedly proposed by the adult. He was able to 
assume the endoxon that he thinks the adult has proposed and 
reason from that starting point. 
 The second aspect that emerges from example 3 concerns the 
fact that children (in this case, Tom) are able to discuss the mean-
ingfulness of a task proposed by an adult. Even though this is not 
the subject of the present paper, it deserves some discussion, as this 
aspect clearly surfaces from our data. Tom’s reaction in turn four is 
indirectly criticizing (or questioning at the least) the adult’s pro-
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posal. In this case, as it is visible in the following of extract 3, the 
adult does pick up the child’s suggestion and modifies the goal of 
the activity following up on this criticism.16 In other cases, 
however, we have shown that children’s attempts to question an 
adult’s proposal are not taken up by the adults participating in the 
interaction. For example, Greco, Mehmeti and Perret-Clermont 
(2017) show that when children question a discussion issue 
proposed by an adult or try to open a new discussion issue, they 
might not be allowed to do so by the adult (for many reasons, 
including the possibility of an adult's lack of decentration).  
 These kinds of findings, which are emerging in the ArgImp 
project, brought us to consider more closely the notion of a “dis-
cussion issue” in relation to the freedom rule of an argumentative 
discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). In its original 
formulation, the freedom rule states that parties to an (ideal) argu-
mentative discussion should be free to advance standpoints and 
arguments. We find, however, that one of the limitations that might 
be imposed on children is due to the fact that they are not free to 
open argumentative discussions by bringing new issues to the 
adult’s attention (or to challenge an adult’s issue). When the issues 
proposed by children deviate from what is expected, or go against 
the adult’s expectations, they are often “suppressed” or left apart in 
the adult-led discussion. We think that carefully observing how 
issues are raised or refused (not always argumentatively) and who 
is legitimate to do so might open new avenues for the study of 
children’s argumentation in educational contexts (see Greco, 
Mehmeti et al. 2017; Greco 2016). This also opens the debate on a 
reconsideration of the teacher's role in argumentative discussions. 
If “teaching” is understood only as a teacher-guided top-down 
activity, and “learning” as acquiring the knowledge that a teacher 
“has”, then the promotion of discussions in classrooms might lead 
to conflicting requirements for the students. This might also explain 
16 This example suggests that a further step in this research could be the recon-
struction of pragmatic inferences made by adults in order to reconstruct the 
meaning of children’s arguments. In some cases, pragmatic inferences might 
break down and this would explain where adults do not understand children (and 
vice versa). 
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why sometimes it is so difficult to promote argumentation in the 
classroom (Schwarz and Baker 2017). Instead, if the teacher's role 
is understood as similar to that of a mediator (Greco, Mehmeti and 
Perret-Clermont 2017) in a triangular relation with students and 
knowledge issues, then a space can open for critical discussion 
among the interlocutors. However, the characteristics of this space 
and the precise role of the teacher and the students deserve more 
research. 
6. Conclusion
In this contribution, we have shown some exemplary findings of 
the ArgImp project, focusing on how the reconstruction of chil-
dren’s inferences within an adult-children discussion (in different 
settings) might contribute to the study of children’s argumentation. 
The systematic analysis of a growing collection of episodes of 
children’s argumentation shows that distinguishing between proce-
dural and material premises (as allowed by the AMT) provides 
useful insights into what the possible misunderstandings might be 
in their interaction with adults. In particular, material premises 
explain possible misalignments between adults and children in 
terms of implicit starting points.  
 These findings contribute to the research stream on argumenta-
tion in context, integrating previous research in developmental 
sociocultural psychology and argumentation studies. We have 
focused on a contextual setting that is still relatively underinvesti-
gated: namely, situations in which very small children (under six 
years) participate in the discussion, including semi-structured play 
activities outside the setting of a school classroom. This kind of 
micro-approach differs from studies that are usually referred to as 
part of the field of “argumentation and education.” In fact, in the 
present study, our aim is neither to assess children’s “individual” 
argumentative skills nor to teach them these skills; also, we have 
not taken the classroom as our context of investigation. Our recon-
struction of children’s inferences and of the implicit premises that 
are present in adult-children conversation, however, might have 
implications at an educational level in the longer run. In fact, one 
could observe what role misunderstandings due to implicit premis-
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es play within school activities. This would be, however, the sub-
ject of future research. 
 Moreover, research on adult-children conversations could be 
extended by considering how much specific interactional micro-
settings leave space for the children to develop their own 
contributions to argumentative discussions freely. A case such as 
the one that emerged in our third example (Fireman Sam’s exam-
ple, section 5) is particularly revealing in this sense because we see 
a child who questions an assignment given by the adult (and the 
adult lets him do this). Whether children are left free to give shape 
to argumentative discussions in the family and in other (formal and 
informal) educational contexts is an open question that would be 
worth exploring (cf. Greco, Mehmeti and Perret-Clermont 2017). 
Observing this aspect would give a perspective on how much chil-
dren are considered rational partners in argumentative discussions. 
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